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The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) was among the first defense programs to require 
a competitive prototyping acquisition strategy under the 19 Sep 2007 USD (AT&L) 
policy Memorandum, “Prototyping and Competition.”  At Milestone A, the program was 
directed to inform the requirements process, validate technology maturity, assess 
commonality of components across a family of vehicles, and assess manufacturing risks. 
As a result, the joint program office simultaneously executed three weapon system 
prototyping contracts in a continuously competitive environment while meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives. The goal of the JAP was to describe the program 
management strategy used in the JLTV Technology Development (TD) phase.  The 
resulting document is a firsthand perspective from working within the Product Manager 
(PM). It discusses how TD acquisition phase program objectives were addressed and 
several unique management solutions.  The focus is an account of planning and managing 
three contracts from Sep 2008 until May 2010. Information from the JLTV TD phase has 
significantly changed the requirements for the EMD phase. In addition to informing 
requirements, the program leveraged the competitive environment by maintaining 
constant emphasis on the contractors to meet cost and schedule. The results demonstrated 
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The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) addresses the need to bring more 
protection into tactical vehicles while continuing to meet payload and performance 
requirements.  The JLTV Program Office mission statement emphasizes these points: 
“The JLTV is a joint service and international program which consists of a family of 
vehicles with companion trailers, capable of performing multiple mission roles that will 
be designed to provide protected, sustained, networked mobility for personnel and 
payloads across the full range of military operations (traditional to irregular).” The JLTV 
reinforces the service’s approach to interoperable platforms that provide expeditionary 
and protected maneuver to forces currently supported by High Mobility Multi-purpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). It is the central component of the U.S. Army’s and 
USMC’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategies. 
In December 2007, the JLTV achieved a major step toward becoming a program 
of record with a Milestone A decision to enter the Technology Development (TD) phase 
of the DoD Acquisition System. The TD phase was needed to reduce technology risk, 
determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full 
system, and demonstrate the integration of critical technology elements on prototypes.  
TD would assess the viability of technologies while simultaneously refining user 
requirements. The decision required the Program Executive Office Combat Support & 
Combat Service Support (PEO CS&CSS) located with TACOM to award multiple 
contracts to acquire working JLTV prototype vehicles. The Project Manager Future 
Tactical Systems, which was provisional at the time, proceeded to prepare a Request for 







This document is an account of how the JLTV Joint Product Office (JPO) 
planned, organized, and conducted the TD competitive prototype program. Background is 
provided and unique aspects of the program strategy are explained. The focus is an 
explanation of contract planning and managing three simultaneous contracts for the same 
item. It’s a period in the program from about Sept. 2008 until May 2010 when vehicles 
were accepted and delivered. Events are described in chronological order. Program 
processes and initiatives are inserted at the point where those aspects emerged in 




II. PROGRAM ORIGINS 
A. THE JLTV NEED IS IDENTIFIED 
The 25-plus-year-old HMMWV fleet was rapidly approaching the end of its 
useful life. At the same time, the need for armor required capabilities far beyond its 
original purpose. In 2005, the Army and United States Marines Corps (USMC) conducted 
a Light Tactical Vehicle Functional Area Analysis (FAA) and Functional Needs Analysis 
(FNA) that identified capability gaps. The basic HMMWV platform was considered sub-
optimized for future missions. New light-wheeled vehicle requirements were placing 
emphasis on force protection, survivability, payload, and transportability; command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR); and reliability to effectively and efficiently defeat current and future threats. As 
a result of the analyses, it was determined that a new system was needed. It should share 
common components to the maximum practical level; possess inherent, modular, light-
weight protection, and survivability suites; have mobility/automotive performance and 
fuel efficiency to complete the mission; support modular plug and play weapons/on board 
computer diagnostics/C4ISR packages tailored to individual missions and to maintain 
affordability; maintain useful payload when armored; and integrate survivability for 
combat operations. The vehicle meeting these needs would no longer simply be a tactical 
vehicle. The system should be designed to balance the “iron triangle” of payload, 
performance, and protection. 
B. NEW START SOLUTION 
Two main demonstration programs already were in process in 2005 to address the 
emerging need.  These were the Army’s Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS) Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and the Marine Corps Combat Tactical 
Vehicle Technology Demonstrator (CTVTD). The lessons learned from these projects 
and a Joint Light Tactical Mobility (JLTM) Evaluation of Alternatives (EoA) were used 
to mitigate risks associated with the JLTV. The EoA (Joint Light Tactical Mobility 
Evaluation of Alternatives Final Report, 2007) evaluated four (4) alternatives: (1) base 
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case HMMWV; (2) product improved HMMWV; (3) Government Off-the-Shelf 
(GOTS)/Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) platforms; and (4) a new-start vehicle design. 
Results of a JLTV Joint Functional Solutions Analysis, EoA, and Market Research 
revealed that alternative (4), a new start, was the most suitable solution to achieve Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) developed requirements. The 
JCIDS would guide the service needs by ensuring combatant commanders are 
represented and requirements are accurately described in an Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD) and future Capabilities Development Document (CDD).  In addition, those early 
ACTD and CTVTD projects planted seeds in industry that encouraged independent 
research and development and continue to benefit program development in areas such as 
improvised explosive device protection and adjustable height suspension. 
C. ACQUISITION STRATEGY EVOLVES 
The FY06 Defense Authorization Bill Section 114 directed a new contract for a 
new class of vehicle that should be executed as a joint-service program between the 
Army and USMC.  The JLTM was one of four initiatives identified as pilots for the 
Concept Decision Process conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
during the period 2006-07 for the purpose of improving Strategic and Tactical 
Acquisition Excellence.  The Concept Decision Process considered the JLTM for review 
with the intent of balancing the trade space of affordable and feasible investments, 
starting programs right with improved up-front planning, awareness of risk and more 
responsive acquisition solutions. The JLTV emerged as a contender. The services 
involved at that time (Army, USMC, Special Operations Command [SOCOM], USAF, 
and Navy) began integrating science and technology initiatives to support JLTV.  The 
program was not envisioned as a heel-to-toe acquisition approach. The newly forming 
Joint Program Office (JPO) sought requirements or technology development activities, 
initiatives and studies that could be conducted concurrently. Numerous simultaneous 
events were conducted in 2006. A joint Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) was 
approved (The Joint Staff, 2006) in November of that year. 
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D. MILESTONE A 
Following preparation of a milestone decision package developed by the 
provisional program management office, the JLTV was presented to the Defense 
Acquisition Executive Milestone Decision Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), Honorable John Young, for a 
Milestone (MS) B in August 2007 to enter the acquisition cycle at the System Design and 
Development phase. The Milestone B was not approved. Instead Mr. Young (USD, 2007) 
directed revising the acquisition strategy to enter at the Milestone A, Technology 
Development (TD) phase.  His concerns were firm requirements, technology maturity, 
and adequate funding.  He directed competitive prototyping of the key vehicle categories, 
analysis of options to sustain competition, maximizing commonality, and demonstrating 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6.  
Shortly after the JLTV decision, USD (AT&L) released the Memorandum, 
Subject: Prototyping and Competition, (USD, 2007) directing that all acquisition 
strategies requiring USD (AT&L) approval include “competitive, technically mature 
prototyping through MS B. The JLTV concept was subject to the memorandum intent to 
discover issues before the costly System Design and Development (SDD) phase. The 
memorandum describes DOD expectations that competitive prototyping would develop 
individual and team system engineering skills. The policy, and ultimately the Milestone 
A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) (USD, 2007), required the JLTV program 
to award at least three contracts using full-and-open competition procedures.  The ADM 
exit criteria required: 1) approval of Capabilities Development Document (CDD) or 
Capability Production Document (CPD) supported by analysis for the TD phase; 2) 
demonstration of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 or more; 3) demonstrate 
protection, transportability, reliability, and producibility; 4) assess commonality across 
the family of vehicles; and 5) assess production technical risks. The exit criteria would 
drive contract requirements, an Integrated Master Plan (IMP), and test plan during a 27-
month TD phase.  Decision documents included the Acquisition Strategy and the Test 
and Evaluation Strategy.   “The JLTV approach will enable the Services to gauge 
technical potential against JLTV key performance parameters, placing emphasis on 
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modeling and simulation, systems component testing, risk reduction, and increased 
readiness for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase”1 (LTC W. 
Petermann, PM JLTV).  Accomplishing TD objectives would inform the requirements 
process and support a MS B decision.  
E. A JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE FORMS 
The Milestone A decision point validated establishment of the JLTV JPO with the 
Army as the service Lead Agency. (Note: JPO used throughout and can also include 
support organizations from the Army and USMC.) The JPO, to be led by a Product 
Manager (PM), was charged to develop an effective joint organizational strategy with 
supporting structure and to conduct detailed management and execution of the program. 
The JPO would include Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service 
Support (PEO CS&CSS) personnel located at the U.S. Army TACOM, Warren, 
Michigan, and the Marine Corps System Command (MCSC) located at Quantico, 
Virginia.  Geographic separation required establishing a virtual operating environment. 
The PM’s authority included funds management, acquisition management, planning and 
execution of production, fielding, and sustainment. JPO staff personnel were assigned to 
Product and Functional Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs would include 
representation from all appropriate disciplines, including user and test communities, as 
well as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  
The PM recognized that a unification strategy was critical. And not just at the 
leadership level, but at the Functional IPTs as well. With one exception, each Functional 
IPT was led by a high-grade level manager from the Army.  The Requirements IPT was 
led by a USMC Combat Development Command representative. Army leaders frequently 
delegated roles and tasks to their USMC service leader, e.g., briefing weekly PM 
meetings, briefing Program Management Reviews (PMRs), and chairing meetings. The 
Functional IPTs sought face-to-face opportunities to strengthen teams. They often 
alternated meeting sites to share the travel burdens. All Pentagon and congressional 
meetings would be joint. Press releases would be developed jointly. The partnership 
                                                 
1 SDD became EMD with the release of DODI 5000.02 in Dec 2008 (Department of Defense, 2008). 
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experienced forming, storming, and norming stages. Each service had different metrics 
for success, such as whose funding obligations and disbursements would be satisfied first. 
The Army tended to be more risk averse. The USMC tended to be more willing to apply 
calculated risks.  
The JPO established and maintained active associations with OSD, Army, and 
USMC staff representatives. Overarching IPT reviews were held after each design 
review. The approach would identify and actively engage the key stakeholders and keep 
them updated throughout the TD phase. They were invited and encouraged to attend all 
major contract and program events. The JLTV was expected to be a future Major Defense 









III. JLTV REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT 
A. JCIDS PROCESS 
In support of the JLTV, an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) developed by the 
Joint Service Combat Developer was approved in 2006. This was followed by initiation 
of the CDD development. The JLTV JPO collaboratively addressed Requirements 
Management for the TD Phase working with the Combat Developer.  The objective was 
to keep requirements development consistent with acquisition development. 
B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS PROCESS 
1. Requirements Management and Analysis Plan 
A joint Requirements Management and Analysis Plan (RMAP) (Department of 
the Army and Department of the Navy, 2009) portrayed here describes the technical and 
management approach the Joint Army and Marine Corps JLTV team used in the 
requirements refinement process activities during TD to update the CDD, the JLTV 
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Figure 1.  RMAP. From (Multiple 2008-9 PM JLTV Program Briefings) 
Figure 1 depicts how the Requirement Analysis Process can result in a 
requirements change. The Requirements IPT determines how to manage the issue. This 
could range from a formal Trade Study if a KPP or KSA is impacted to a less rigorous 
quick-look. The IPT may also determine it is a non-issue or should be placed in TBD. 
The subject matter expert’s judgment and data base software may be used to trace out 
what other requirements could be affected by the change. The RMAP would hear the 
voice of the user and give decision-makers timely requirements information. Required 
capabilities and performance characteristics were identified in a PD document that was 
written in performance terms to the greatest practical extent.  RMAP attributes included 
expanded Materiel/Combat Developer collaboration; System Engineering (SE) approach 
to CDD Refinement; and knowledge-based and incremental shadow-CDD refinement. 
The SE approach to CDD refinement was accomplished with transparency and rigor 
through continual user representative involvement and formal cross-IPT events to 





Issue Team that functioned as an information conduit and problem identifier. They relied 
on the SE and Test & Evaluation IPTs for interpretation, assessment, expert judgment, 
and data.  
2. Knowledge Point Reviews 
A key element of the RMAP was the use of CDD Knowledge Points (KP) that 
leveraged incremental TD Phase knowledge gained through contract execution and 
testing, interpreted implications on requirements, and minimized requirements risk. A 
total of seven government-only quarterly KP reviews were planned for the TD phase. 
KPs were informed by the analysis of efforts from all three JLTV prototype vehicle TD 
contractors. KP objectives were aligned with significant program events. The JPO sought 
the knowledge that would support KP agenda items through contractor responses to 
Integrated Master Plan (IMP) requirements, contract data deliverables, and Government 
testing. The KPs would reduce Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase 
uncertainty and acquisition risk by tying program knowledge to the requirements 
documents. 
Contributing to KPs was a primary responsibility of the Requirements Issues 
Team. The Requirements IPT was supported by an Issue Team that performed as an 
information conduit and problem identifier. They relied on SE and the Test & Evaluation 
IPTs for interpretation, assessment, expert judgment, and data. Issues Team members 
were the Requirements representatives on each contract IPT. KP reviews were used as a 
mechanism for confirming CDD requirements or indicating changes were needed to 
either CDD requirements or a Purchase Description (PD) content. Supporting data were 
gleaned from Vendor Compliance Matrixes delivered under the contracts, test results, 
TPMs (Technical Performance Measure), a holistic assessment of whole system 
trajectory toward meeting the requirements, or a failing in key areas. TPMs were defined 
in the System Engineering Plan (SEP) and reflected in the RMAP.  Other analyses 
(internal or external) performed were indirectly related to vendor competitive prototype 
designs, (i.e., AoA results, Cost Data, etc). KPs would be followed by an SE IPT review 
to develop specifications or validate traceability to the PD. 
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3. Trade Studies 
The Requirements IPT determined how to handle open actions per the RMAP.  
New requirements or those that may present a cost, schedule, or performance risk could 
require a Trade Study. These candidate requirements were channeled through a 
determination of whether a formal analysis was needed for a high impact change 
proposal, or if a high-level requirement was affected, such as a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) or Key System Attribute (KSA). A less rigorous analysis or quick-look 
fell under a TBR (To Be Resolved) for a lower impact change proposal or if a lower level 
requirement was affected.  If an Issue was already known and already decided, then it 
was a non-Issue. Other Issues were placed into To Be Determined (TBD), CDD 
Unaffected, or Non-Critical PD Change. To resolve Other Issues, leadership provided 
guidance, problems were scoped, and resources were identified to support necessary 
action. CDD change proposals required supporting analyses as well as the recommended 
changes to language.  An organization recommending changes needed to present such 
analysis at the IPT meetings.  CDD changes would take effect in the JLTV EMD phase. 
4. TD Phase JLTV Family of Vehicle Categories are Identified 
The JLTV FoVs (throughout most of the TD phase) consisted of three Payload 
Categories—Category A (3,500 lbs. payload); Category B (4,000 lbs. for USMC & 4,500 
lbs. payload for U.S. Army); and Category C (5,100 lbs. payload). Each category would 
be equipped with a companion trailer capable of carrying an equivalent payload. All 
configurations were designed to maximize commonality while meeting the specific needs 
of the user. Payload categories were further tailored with a set of mission-specific 
components (C4I, armor, weapons) to achieve requirements of all sub-configurations. 
The three Payload Categories represented FoVs for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team 
(IBCT) and other Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), the USMC’s Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB), and other services.  The categories would bring back payload capacity 
that HMMWVs progressively lost as armor protection was added. Contracts were 
competitively awarded during the TD phase for original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) to supply prototype sample vehicles of each category along with companion 
trailers in a “system of systems” approach. The JLTV requires trailers which match the 
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vehicle’s off-road performance capability, carry the same weight, and provide full 
interoperability. Developing a trailer in conjunction with the vehicle would assure 
compatibility that may be compromised with existing military trailers. 
5. RMAP/CDD Process Analysis and Results 
Establishing the Combat Developer-Materiel Developer Requirements IPT 
formalized a key working relationship. The IPT regularly reported to the PM. DA/USMC 
leadership recognized that the JPO supported the process. The RMAP/CDD process gave 
IPT members a broad opportunity to influence or contribute to CDD development. A 
pace of regularly scheduled meetings, KP reviews, and data sharing kept stakeholders 
informed. There were multiple ways to work through differences.  The partnership broke 
some potential barriers between CD-MD, resulting in frequent open communication, and 
a collaborative dialogue.  The process-oriented strategy may have reduced the number of 
unplanned meetings, increased agreements, and reduced issues. The CD entered higher 
level service/OSD reviews with one voice on most issues. The Issue Team provided a 
formalized process for resolving issues. A defined and organized process provided 
mechanisms to work problems and develop solutions. Both the CD and MD could request 
studies from each other. Issues could be spun off to the Risk Working Group. The 
product teams had a means to initiate action to resolve a problem or study a discovery 
that surfaced from the course of the contract activities or contact task execution.  
Existence of a process kept CDD progress in motion. War fighter needs, whether 
stated or not, could be defined through synergy, investigation, observation, and creativity. 
It created tasks and milestones that could be measured.  The Requirements Team could 
identify and record accomplishments.  They were armed for informing leadership by 
presenting answers or recommendations. The Army/USMC could be in a position to 










IV. TD PHASE BEGINS 
A. JPO ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE DEVELOPS 
The JPO organization strategy was to develop a structure that mirrored the 
program phase. The JPO was designed with three teams each dedicated to one of the 
three TD contracts. 
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Figure 2.  PM JLTV Organization Diagram. From Multiple 2008-9 PM JLTV 
 Program Briefings. 
1. Horizontal and Vertical Communication 
Each contract team was led by an Assistant Project Manager (APM). These IPTs 
would also be known as product teams. The APMs reported to the PM. These “vertical” 
product teams were staffed with a Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR), two 
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Systems Engineers, C4I Engineer, Product Quality Manager, Earned Value Manager, 
Procurement Analyst, Cost Analyst, Logistician, Program (budget) Analyst, Integrated 
Master Schedule Analyst, and a User representative all dedicated to one of the three 
contract efforts.  Each functional specialist on this team was also a member of a 
supporting Functional IPT. The functional leads reported directly to the PM. They were 
not dedicated to a product team, but they provided horizontal support to all three 
contracts. The PM sought a structure supporting process consistency across the three 
JLTV TD contractors. The functional teams had support contractors and arrangements in 
place with other TACOM and MCSC organizations before contract start. It enabled the 
JPO to make efficient use of a relatively small staff. Approval of an organization staff 
Concept Plan opened the door for timely hiring. In addition to technical expertise, the 
functional leaders provided interpersonal skills and a steady influence on team tasks and 
challenging issues.  The product and functional leaders provided the contractors with 
advice, interpreting performance requirements and specifications, and helped them to 
manage priorities. Throughout the TD phase, the model would promote sharing lessons 
learned up/down and left/right within the organization. The structure would empower 
managers, grow leaders, and mirror the program phase. The PM sought, and then later 
gained, approval to provide team leaders additional authorities. The structure would 
enable re-organizations that took place following vehicle deliveries and again at the end 
of the contracts as the JPO prepared for MS B and development of the EMD phase 
contract solicitation.  
2. Program Office Tasks 
TD phase goals, objectives, events, and tasks were identified and planned in 
anticipation that the JLTV would achieve Milestone B and become a Major Defense 
Acquisition Program (MDAP).  While the program managed multiple contracts, the JPO 
would simultaneously conduct or participate in such activities as Program Status 
Reviews, OSD focus groups, General Officer Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Portfolio 
Reviews, Overarching IPTs, Working IPTs, Planning Programming and Budget 
Execution (PPBE) reviews, test planning meetings, C4I test meetings, PD reviews, EMD 




The PM’s ability to communicate with JLTV customers, stakeholders, 
contractors, and JPO personnel would be critical to program success. A Strategic 
Communications (STRATCOM) and media relations plan were created to ensure the JPO 
executed and coordinated consistent public communications and media relations tactics, 
both internally and externally. JLTV STRATCOM was implemented through a media 
relations standard operating procedure.  It would be the first program in PEO CS&CSS to 
have a dedicated communications strategy professional. It was considered critical for the 
U.S. Army and USMC program offices to execute coordinated and consistent 
communication.  This approach would help control rumors and release timely and 
accurate public information. Press kits were developed and displays would be held at 
symposiums. Opportunities were planned for key events that included Start of Work 
Meeting (SOWM), Critical Design Review (CDR), and vehicle deliveries. Vehicles were 
displayed in the Pentagon courtyard shortly after the Government accepted delivery.  
VIPs were invited to ride and drive at the test center. A JLTV Branding and Style Guide 
was developed for use in all communication mediums. It provided guidance and standard 
formats for logo use, chart templates, color palette, fonts, and cover documents. Styles 
and guidelines were developed for conference and exhibit materials. JLTV TD 
contractors were asked to cooperate with the program objective to speak with one voice. 
The contract contained a clause that required contractors to obtain Contracting Office 
approval before releasing information to the public and comply with Army Regulation 
360-1 The Army Public Affairs Program. Applying the JLTV STRATCOM helped insure 
that consistent and accurate information was presented throughout TD. 
C. ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL 
Following MDA approval, the JPO followed Federal Acquisition Regulations Part 
15 and completed a full-and-open competitive RFP release, industry Q&A period, Source 
Selection Board, and award of three Cost-type Research and Development contracts to 




Control reports, perform Earned Value Management (EVM), and hold design reviews 
followed by the manufacture of seven JLTV prototype vehicles and four companion 
trailers. Industry could propose new start prototypes for each payload category or 
modified off-the-shelf vehicles. The latter was not expected for the vehicles due to 
continually emerging JLTV requirements and the amount and depth of design data that 
the contract required. Acquiring technical documentation was an additional primary 
objective of the contract. Data acquisition was essential to the program for numerous 
reasons, including managing risk, assessing technical readiness, verifying assumptions, 
and gauging industry capabilities all of which played a critical role in JLTV requirements 
validation and development.  Each contract would require delivery of up to 58 different 
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) items. To accomplish these tasks the 
contractors would need to identify resources, organize sub-IPTs, develop a work 
breakdown structure, establish procedures, develop and present plans to the government, 
and identify areas not understood. The contractors would need to conduct a series of 
reviews and formal meetings. The vehicles were required to be delivered to both 
Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds for a twelve-month government test.  Initial 
delivery was due starting 15 months after contract award.  
D. CONTRACT SOURCE SELECTION 
Source selection was a best value approach based upon design maturity, program 
maturity, logistics commonality, past performance, and cost. The RFP explained that 
design maturity was the most important factor. The RFP also allowed the government to 
consider awarding based on technical diversity. Program maturity included the sub-
elements resource loaded schedule, Capability Maturity Model Integration, and Systems 
Engineering. The RFP generated several competitive range proposals that met acquisition 
plan objectives, and offered reduced risk and diverse design solutions. A Source 
Selection Evaluation Board developed an assessment of each proposal for the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA). The selection process took approximately seven months. It 
included a delay while the Army and USMC sought additional Research and 




three contracts. The program was further set back when two of the unsuccessful bidders 
filed protests within one week of the contract award announcement.  Contract activities 
were immediately suspended while the source selection board responded to the protest. 
The delay lasted 100 days, after which time the protests were denied. 
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V. PRE-CONTRACT ACTIVITIES 
While a program schedule setback, the protest period was utilized by the JPO to plan 
contract starts. The five strategies described in the following paragraphs either grew from 
existing processes tailored for the JLTV program or were completely unique.  
A. DATA MANAGEMENT 
1. Adapting Information Systems 
The Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center’s 
(TARDEC) Advanced Collaborative Environment (ACE) that existed before the TD 
Request for Proposal was released served as the foundation for JLTV unclassified data 
management.  TARDEC personnel tailored an ACE interface to meet PM JLTV’s needs. 
ACE contained secure government portals for each functional team and product team, 
and enabled USMC office access, as well as provided three secure portals for the industry 
contract teams.  Multiple layers of security minimized risk of proprietary information 
spillage.  IPTs managed their folder configurations and their document storage. ACE 
provided version control and check-in/out tracking. Due to anticipation for hundreds of 
contractor deliverables, PM JLTV and TARDEC co-developed a CDRL tracking process 
in ACE to streamline receipt, review, and acceptance.   
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2. CDRL Processing 
 
Figure 3.  PM JLTV CDRL Flow. From Multiple 2008-9 PM JLTV 
 Program Briefings 
The CORs would coordinate preparations prior to receipt, record deliveries and 
route CDRLs to functional IPTs, assure reviews were ongoing, collaborate on 
assessments and decisions, process acceptances, and keep the contractor advised on 
progress. Most data submissions could be posted to ACE. The contractor delivered some 
by disc with only a cover letter posed to the CDRL folder. The COR gave the deliverable 
a cursory review that included unique or potentially problem markings.  The contractors 
frequently chose to apply very restrictive distribution statements and markings given the 
competitive nature of the program. The COR used a JLTV-unique ACE interface to select 
the appropriate document reviewer point of contact (POC). After completing the review, 
the POC notified the COR. The system enabled the COR to see occurrence time/dates 
and run summary level reports.  
23 
 
3. Data Requirements 
The contracts required delivery of up to 58 CDRLs items. Each contract Section C 
requirement for data submission had a corresponding DD Form 1423-1 with 
specifications, information such as the associated Data Item Description (DID), delivery 
terms, and format.  Most of the CDRL items required a multiple number of deliveries.  
a. Examples of JLTV CDRLs: 
 Family of Vehicles Producibility Assessment: Required contractor 
to estimate the unit production cost and technical risks associated 
with manufacturing. This deliverable would help the JPO address 
the Producibility ADM requirement. 
 Risk Tracking Report:  Monthly delivery containing descriptions, 
estimated severity, and mitigation plans. 
 System Specification 
 Modeling and Simulation Plan 
 Technology and Growth Plan 
 Hazard Log: Log of hazards identified through analysis and 
testing. Each hazard was classified by severity and probability 
following a contract guidance attachment. 
 Reliability Prediction Data 
 Vehicle Inspection and Test Plan 
 Mine Blast Analysis 
 Tester Training Plan 
 Commonality Assessment: This deliverable would help the JPO 
address an ADM requirement to assess logistics support and parts 
commonality across the JLTV family of vehicles. 
 Draft Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM): Less than 
fully developed TM’s to demonstrate capability for using IETM 
technology to perform vehicle fault diagnostics with links to 
troubleshooting task descriptions. 
B. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE 
COR was a critical position for the product team. CORs monitored contractor 
performance, helped preserve contractor’s rights, explained contract terms, prepared 
communications concerning contract interpretation and performance, monitored 
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government-furnished property, and established and maintained correspondence files. 
Throughout the TD phase the program would continue to be conducted in a competitive 
environment. The competitive environment would continue during the transition to EMD. 
EMD contracts also would  be awarded through full-and-open competition. The COR 
was expected to assure that JPO personnel that interfaced directly with industry 
maintained competition awareness. They helped the Contracting Officer insure that fair 
and consistent decisions and actions were applied across the three contracts.   
C. DEVELOPING AND INTEGRATING RISK MANAGEMENT 
A Risk Management (RM) methodology and accompanying tool were developed 
for identifying, evaluating, and managing JLTV risks. The risk management approach 
was a way to drive systems engineering in all functions. The methodology employed a 
comprehensive Risk Management Assessment Structure (RMAS) used to identify and 
trace risks to various programmatic and technical system attributes. Identified risks were 
evaluated using JLTV customized severity of impact and probability of occurrence 
scales. Actions necessary for managing risks were documented and monitored. The 
process was designed to empower the IPTs to manage their risks. Risk elevation 
thresholds were defined as mechanisms for raising awareness of risks to higher levels of 
management as necessary. Details of the RM process flow, job functions/interfaces, and 
two-phase implementation plan served as the foundation of a JLTV Risk Management 
Plan. 
It became clear early after contract starts that the contractors did not share the 
same RM philosophy as the JPO.RM Plans were slow to develop and complete. 
Identifying risks was not appearing as a priority in meetings. The Tracking Reports 
contained fewer than expected. Effective RM relied on a higher level of openness than 
was shared. 
D. BATTLE RHYTHM 
The JPO established a weekly battle rhythm to carry forward into the contract 
period. The battle rhythm was based on driving disciplined communications throughout 
the organization.  There would be organized communications with a predictable and clear 
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path. PM leadership was aware that regular meetings and processes were in place to work 
issues before getting elevated. APM-led product team and functional meetings fed 
weekly PM-chaired synchronization (or “synch”) meetings. Information was presented on 
charts prepared to a standard format, but intended to support a free flow of 
communication. If charts were current they could support short notice higher level or 
other ad hoc JLTV briefings. IPT members quickly recognized their roles and flow of 
communication. The synch provided the primary formal exchange across the three 
contract efforts in a forum that included the USMC JLTV PMO. The synch ensured a 
continual sharing among teams. The JLTV was a program relying on innovation and did 
not follow a template. The meetings would help confirm that the work was heading in the 
right direction.  
The term battle rhythm aided project management by referring to weekly 
government-contractor meetings, weekly IPT meetings, and balancing Monday-Tuesday 
schedules and preparations for Wednesday briefings to the PM. Thursdays were typically 
available for sub-IPT and special/ad hoc meetings. Fridays were used to get caught up 
and prepare to do it again on Monday. The term reminded all that there was a process 
geared to maintain steady progress and they were depended upon to maintain readiness 
for higher level reviews. It needed buy-in from all participants to include primary and 
alternate participants. Meeting chairs and leadership could quickly recognize issues that 
needed action to discuss or work offline.  As project activities and agendas became 
routine they tended to become more efficient in ways that far outweighed where there 
could be complacency. As an example of the efficiency, after the product teams and JPO 
settled on metrics, the data and changes became a tool to guide analysis and decisions.  
E. START OF WORK MEETING PLAN 
The JPO accepted Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) offer to design a Start 
of Work Meeting (SOWM) format, conduct SOWM format training, provide advice 
drawn on their experience with similar SOWM formats, and facilitate SOWM 
proceedings.  Using DAU’s “New Program Startup Workshop (NPSW)” format (DAU, 
http://www.dau.mil/homepage%20Documents/npsw.aspx) for JLTV SOWM was also 
encouraged by the Military Deputy to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). There was 
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some reluctance in the JPO to deviate from the SOWM formats that were familiar to 
many of the experienced personnel.  DAU believed the JLTV program would benefit 
from aligning Government and contractor teams and then formalizing the new joint teams 
by developing charters. Key components of the SOWM were: 
 Agenda development common for each product team.  
 Identifying topic leaders. 
 Government briefing development. 
 Develop SOWM break out meeting report formats. 
 Outline IPT charter templates to be completed during the SOWM. 





Pre-contract activity resulted in anxious anticipation. It was released when the 
protest was denied in February 2009 and the product teams were free to contact the three 
new JLTV contractors. The product team APM leaders immediately met with contract 
counterparts to: 
 Share introductions. 
 Exchange contact information. 
 Start building relationships. 
 Set SOWM dates. 
 Plan SOWM success factors and constraints. 
 Explain the motivation and expectations for the SOWM and participants. 
 Establish awareness of contract issues and insure a methodical approach 
that will keep issues active until resolved. 
 Create action item logs with a numbering system and priorities and due 
dates. 
 Identify issues.  
The product teams began parsing contract requirements so functional leads knew 
their contract responsibilities. Each was tasked to ensure his or her counterparts gained a 
complete understanding of requirements. The product teams encouraged conducting 
technical deep dives in this period as a way to initiate data flow and collaboration 
between the contractor staff and the JPO product teams. The PM wanted to assure 
consistency across the three product teams. The PM looked for efficient use of resources, 
communication flow, and sharing of good practices among the three product teams. The 
contractors looked at these early meetings as critical tasks.  
F. START OF WORK MEETING 
The objectives of the contractually required SOWMs were to begin establishing 
partnerships, share goals, and hear from leadership on both sides. More importantly it 
was the government’s opportunity to make it clear to the contractors that the primary 
objective of the TD phase was to develop and validate requirements as well as ensure 
maturity of technology. Government leadership emphasized that the contract would 
require openness and shared responsibility for the success of the program. The 
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contractor’s role was to help accomplish that objective. In doing so, despite the 
competitive environment and anticipated tendency of the contractors to protect their 
designs and data, the JPO would strive to help them attain a practicable comfort level for 
sharing the depth of data that was sought. The JPO sought to instill confidence in the 
ability to protect confidentiality and establish trust.  
1. SOWM Participation 
The first of the week-long SOWMs took place 15 days after contract start 
followed by the second and third in the proceeding weeks.  The amount of time available 
for each contractor’s meeting and the lead time to prepare challenged them. The total 
number of government and contractor attendees ranged from 100-120 representatives at 
each event. Government attendees included JLTV OIPT members from OSD, DA, 
USMC, and DCMA. Key government and contractor attendees were provided assigned 
seating.  Day one participation included Government and company executives. The Army 
and USMC PEOs provided their perspectives. The event speakers stressed that initiating 
partnerships was vitally important to success even though the contract did not require 
them to be established.  The government leaders expressed a commitment to helping the 
contractor to succeed. Congratulations were heard throughout the week acknowledging 
the contractor’s accomplishment in earning one of the three contracts. Each SOWM 
lasted four days with a System Requirements Review (SRR) on the fifth. Each day’s 
agenda included a wrap-up of the previous day. 
2. SOWM Objectives 
The government looked to set a positive tone in a series of presentations. 
Briefings gave government and contractor representatives the opportunity to describe 
their perspectives and philosophies. Key JLTV project team leaders began to validate 
team alignments, set team objectives, and identify a path to achieve project objectives. 
Government team leaders described and listed the duties of JPO personnel. The 
contractors later recognized that this early effort to map their PM structures to the JPO 
personnel became a successful strategy. Taking time to insure the conduct of the 
proceedings were clear got participants involved in exchanges and outcomes. 
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3. SOWM Activities 
The three contactors confirmed the JPO assumption that the RFP gave them the 
instruction and program objectives they would need to identify resources and determine 
what IPTs were needed. The SOWM was the opportunity for the government personnel 
and contractor counterparts to initiate meeting routines and activity plans and to write 
team charters containing common objectives and goals that identify who would work 
together. The charters were in draft form as a result of pre-SOWM JPO activities. The 
charters were meant to demonstrate a common understanding of roles and objectives, 
define delegated authorities, role, responsibilities, shared program objectives, key 
performance indicators, reporting requirements, and contract deliverables. The charters 
would align organizations culturally and structurally in support of a shared vision. They 
would become a blueprint for working together and communicating. APMs and IPT 
leaders created organization charts that aligned government personnel and their 
corresponding contractor personnel.  The contracts contained language requiring 
establishing and maintaining IPTs. Contractors were expected to keep the government 
informed of changes to personnel and structures.  Product functional leaders for system 
engineering, C4I engineering, supportability and logistics, test and evaluation, business 
management, and contracting each chaired a JLTV TD SOWM one-day breakout session. 
Objectives and tasks were developed in advance for the breakout sessions. The breakouts 
encouraged both the government and contractor personnel to begin collaboration on team 
functions, IPT procedures, and battle rhythm. This approach was a departure from 
focusing on contract execution. The idea was to encourage the contractors to feel a part of 
the program instead of just conducting a typical customer-provider relationship. The 
partnership would help the JPO find answers and develop ideas.   
Establishing the program cost and schedule baseline was one of the contractor’s 
most critical early tasks. Since the next major event was the Integrated Baseline Review 
(IBR), one of the major SOWM activities was to discuss the schedule, planning and 
preparations to determine if the contractors were on track for the event. Careful planning 




G. POST-SOWM TO INTEGRATED BASELINE REVIEWPERIOD 
The JLTV contractors had expectations for the government to practice open 
communications, and to demonstrate willingness to work as a team. For each, the product 
team was the primary face of the government. Throughout this period product team 
members participated in the contractor’s regular weekly IPT meetings, started identifying 
risks or indicators, and continued to assess each contractor’s understanding of contract 
requirements. There was general agreement among the government and industry that the 
test vehicle delivery schedule was ambitious. The short timeframe to complete prototype 
design required a high level of activity with frequent interaction. During this early stage, 
IPT members began reviewing approaches to contract deliverables or reviewing draft 
reports.  Every Monday was a checkpoint and tag-up to discuss plans, activities, and 
issues. Open SOWM action items were reviewed. A Systems Engineering Management 
Plan (SEMP) was due in draft form in this period of time. The JPO expected that a well-
crafted SEMP would provide an orientation to the contractor’s approach and be an early 
indicator of program development. 
The pace offered little down time. This would have been an important period to 
conduct a SOWM assessment review with and without the contractors.  Each product 
team and IPT should have taken time to review the briefing charts to enable second 
chances to ask questions. This would also be an opportunity to obtain feedback from 
contractors once they had opportunity to assess what they heard compared to their 
priorities and risks.  
1. Government-Contractor Battle Rhythm 
One of the significant challenges for both the government product teams and each 
of the contractors was to maintain momentum. The product teams were small task-
oriented teams designed to encourage innovation and fast action. Each established a 
regular weekly meeting with their contractor.  A routine day and time was set with a 
regular location. Meetings with the product teams occurred mainly through internet 
conferencing. It was recognized that face-to-face was the most effective approach; 
however, that ability was limited due to geographic barriers and travel cost.  A standing 
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agenda was developed jointly with the contractor and distributed in advance of each 
meeting. The meeting was intended to discuss higher level issues, progress towards 
contractor deliverables, upcoming events, and metrics. Each IPT member was expected to 
accept responsibility and make decisions or recognize when to bring issues to the entire 
team. Initiative discussions would support the vertical flow of information to the weekly 
JPO synch meeting as well as identify actions and issues for rapid horizontal flow to the 
functional teams. The contractors were committed to consistently conduct the primary 
meeting and sub-IPT meetings on the regular scheduled days to include assigning 
substitute roles when necessary.   The contractors developed a slide package that was 
distributed via ACE in advance. Live edits were made during the meetings. This was 
aided by web conferencing tools to support virtual meetings. The final slides were 
uploaded to ACE within the following two days.  
2. JPO Assisting the Contractors 
Through the product team meetings and sub-IPT reviews the contractors expected 
the JPO to help them succeed. The JPO functional support team structure was a new 
concept to them. They needed to understand the dynamics and determine how best to 
utilize that program aspect. In particular there was early trepidation about the control of 
proprietary and other competition sensitive information within the JPO due to in-depth 
functional personnel exposure to all three contractor’s technical data. This was amplified 
because the contractors were aware that the government was planning full-and-open 
competition for the JLTV EMD contract.  IPT members sought additional early 
opportunities to meet face-to-face.  The program tempo also forced frequent interaction. 
Contractors were asked to present concepts and provide data that supported their 
solutions to the personnel that were dedicated to their contract. The contractors needed 
CDRL guidance and an understanding of government expectations for requirements and 
submission. As interactions occurred, the teams looked for ways to help solve their 
problems or identify risks. IPT issues were overcome by not for attribution discussions 
and early deliveries of draft documents and data. The contractors quickly recognized they 
could come to the JPO with problems.  Some contractor adjustments required them to add 
and change personnel. The product teams helped by assisting in the orientation of new 
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contractor personnel to the program. At the same time, the product team’s continual 
assessment of the impact of personnel and organizational changes on contractor system 
engineering was critical to JPO situational awareness. 
3. Contract Challenges Identified 
Program challenges began to emerge that ranged from contract issues, aggressive 
contractor schedules, and technical performance.  The JPO learned that the contractors 
felt that the government sought a TRL 6 JLTV design which was more advanced than 
industry  expected for a TD phase program. The contractors also felt there were too many 
SOW requirements that described how to design the vehicle. However, contract language 
provided a means to trade or remove low priority technical requirements through a Trade 
Study option Aiming to present the best possible TRL 6 design, the contractors found this 
trade process to be challenging and thus would depend on JPO personnel for advice and 
questions to help them find solutions, make logical decisions, and submit supporting 
justification in the form of a Trade Study. Trade studies informed the government on 
feasibility of integrated solutions to achieve requirements.  
4. Metrics Emerge 
The product teams collaborated with their contractors to develop project metrics. 
Metrics became valuable to all weekly meetings. They provided the latest top-level key 
data points for product team meetings, showed progress, highlighted problems, captured 
accomplishments, and assured visibility of problems and issues. Examples included: 
vehicle weight projections, requirements compliance, risks, technical performance 
measures, and a projected full-rate production Unit Manufacturing Cost. Eventually 
metrics were used to feed a set of metrics that the JPO developed for program monitoring 
and assessment. Metrics were a challenging area to develop and work effectively. It was 
recognized that each team needed to design a set that was unique to their particular 
relationship. Over time, each product team was able to tap into the contractor’s talents. 





was the intent for a period of time. That approach may have achieved early 
standardization, but an opportunity could have missed to leverage the contractor’s 
creativity.  
5. Contract Delivery Requirements List (CDRL) Item Management 
The product team COR was responsible for managing the 58 CDRL data items. 
The value of establishing a process proved itself when over the course of TD the three 
contractors had submitted a total of approximately 1400 individual entries.  The CORs 
insured that the contractors had logical plans for providing the correct information on 
time.  The CORs coordinated preparations prior to receipt, recorded deliveries and routed 
CDRLs to functional IPTs, assured reviews were ongoing, collaborated on assessments 
and decisions, processed acceptances, and kept the contractor advised on progress. The 
CORs collaborated with both the government reviewers and the contractor to develop 
solutions to rejected submissions.   The CORs developed CDRL data bases and metrics 
for use as tools to explain status updates during weekly IPT meetings.  Metrics were also 
useful for past performance assessments. CDRL review responsiveness was critical to the 
contractors and they had high expectations for timely, quality reviews, and meaningful 
feedback. 
H. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 
Formal components of project execution were the quarterly PMRs that were held 
quarterly throughout the contract. Many were held in conjunction with another review. 
PMRs were usually hosted by the contractors which included locations at both 
administrative and production facilities. PMRs sometimes included tours and 
demonstrations. Invitations were extended to many of the JLTV stakeholders as a 
continuing open communication approach. Common basic agendas across the three 
contractors were developed by a collaboration of the three product teams.  The common 
approach gave a standard look and experience for PM JLTV management and functional 





 leadership it provided the periodic opportunity to address the key government program 
personnel.  The PMRs would show joint ownership of the project by the government and 
OEMs.  
Each government product team member collaborated on a presentation with his or 
her contractor counterpart. The two then jointly delivered an overview of issues, top 
risks, activities, and accomplishments, and a project look-ahead to next PMR. The 
approach resulted in the contractors providing comprehensive briefings in each area. The 
PMR served as a checkpoint to those involved to reset targets and helped to identify areas 
critical to meeting objectives. It provided a point where the contractors could discuss 
organizational and personnel changes, and public affair activities.  JLTV TD contractors 
were large and highly visible enterprises. The JLTV was an important program and they 
chose to expose their involvement at public events and industry symposia. Action items 
were recorded all through the PMR. The PMRs would reveal growing or potential issues, 
challenges, and problems. They would show the JPO how the contractors were working 
with their major sub-contractors. Actions were reviewed at the end of the sessions and 
target completion dates were set. 
I. AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION 
At the same time that JLTV Milestone A preparations and reviews were 
occurring, the U.S. DoD and Australian DoD were pursuing a Project Arrangement (PA), 
an international cooperative agreement between the U.S. and Australia. The Australian 
Defence department wanted to participate in JLTV development to include funding 
acquisition of test vehicles and providing Cooperative Program Personnel (CPP) to 
support the JPO. The Australian participation presented a unique requirement for TD 
phase test vehicles to demonstrate right hand controlled versions. At the SOWMs, the PM 
announced that the U.S. Department of Defense had entered a PA with the Australia 
Department of Defence concerning the JLTV. Approval of the PA meant that Australia 
had provided funding to acquire additional test vehicles. In addition, under the PA, 
Australia would provide military officer CPPs to co-locate with the JLTV JPO and 
provide program management support. The CPPs provided expertise in engineering, 
testing, and logistics while serving on Functional IPTs. Acquiring these additional 
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vehicles meant that the three contractors would be asked to provide a proposed cost. The 
initiative led to a modification to each contract to develop right-hand drive vehicles for 
delivery after the contractors completed building and delivering on the initial U.S. 
Army/USMC order. 
J. INTEGRATED BASELINE REVIEW (IBR) 
The contractors were required to host and participate in an IBR within 90 days 
after contract start. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Notice of Earned 
Value Management System (EVMS) (DFARS, subpart 252.234-7002) allows the IBR to 
take place up to 180 days after contract award. Reducing to 90 days was considered to 
permit less time than optimal for a contractor to prepare, but the JLTV program’s 
compressed schedule for the TD phase drove the need for early dates.  The basic IBR 
requirements were outlined in the IMP Accomplishments and Criteria. The IBR was the 
first major event that would challenge the contractors to demonstrate they had a clear 
understanding of the contract requirements and EVM was on the right path. The JPO 
Business Management Office personnel along with the DCMA experts assisted contractor 
IBR preparations. 
1. Earned Value Management (EVM) 
EVM was required because of the contract type (Cost-plus incentive fee and that 
each contract exceeded the $20 million dollar DOD EVM threshold (USD, 2005). EVM 
was used to integrate costs, schedule, and scope of work to measure contract performance 
to requirements and goals. EVM tools would provide a schedule risk management 
method and indicate if a JLTV contractor was likely to overrun costs, or if they were 
using contract funds efficiently. There were ten CDRLs under each contract directly 
associated with meeting EVM objectives. In the aggregate EVM would reveal whether 
the contractor’s entire effort was on schedule and within cost. 
2. IBR Training 
JPO IBR teams were organized and formal training was provided for participants 
that covered IBR conduct and data products they would review.  An IBR was new to 
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nearly all of the JPO team members who participated.  The JPO contracted a DAU 
instructor to conduct classes.  Training covered IBR fundamentals, data items used, and 
the interview process. It included conducting mock interviews to provide practice and 
reinforce learning objectives.   
3. IBR Conduct 
Each IBR began with a government team briefing to the contractor to list and 
discuss EVM/business management CDRLs, IBR activities, control accounts to be 
reviewed, IBR objectives, and product data analysis conducted by the government to 
date. The IBR included government personnel interviewing Cost Account Managers 
(CAM). These interviews were organized based on the contractor’s work-breakdown 
structures and alignment with functional areas.  The JPO developed a standard set of 
control account oriented questions to collect technical knowledge and data, and to 
validate EVM knowledge and training. The assessment sought to determine whether the 
CAMs had control over EVM costs, schedule, and technical content. The government 
team used the contractor’s Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), and conducted DCMA’s 
14-point Schedule Health Assessment metrics and Schedule Risk Assessments.  The 
analysis looked at whether the IMS included all contract SOW requirements and all 
CDRLs while clearly identifying all the key project milestones. 
4. Integrated Master Schedule 
The contractors were required to submit their initial IMS at the IBR. The IMS 
update became a weekly (or bi-weekly) contract deliverable that each contractor was 
expected to use for analysis, completing work breakdown structures, organizing, creating 
staffs, developing risk assessment, and to resource their sub-IPTs and task teams. The 
IMS forced the contractors to also train personnel lacking EVM skills where needed to 
support the EVM processes and reports. Each IMS was a complex data base that 
contained over 2000 lines of information. IMS analysis was capable of providing 
valuable program metrics and insight into contractor performance. IMS maturity, or the 
lack thereof, became an indicator of how well the contractor was managing and 
synchronizing overall systems engineering and finances against the contract 
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requirements.  The JPO emphasized IMS development and use as a critical tool at the 
IBR and PMRs.  Because of early recognition of the IMS importance and a lack of JPO 
expertise, the PM acquired contractor support to help. This enabled the JPO to actively 
and frequently assist the contractors with IMS management and analysis.  The PM’s 
initiative proved its value early and often throughout the design and build phases. 
5. IBR Objectives 
The intent of the IBRs were to verify the contractors were effectively using EVM 
and that the government could understand the basis and derivation of their Performance 
Measurement Baseline (PMB). The PMB needed to include the complete contract scope 
of work (SOW) to show adequate resources and consistency with the IMS and IMP, and  
to reflect that there was not excessive risk. It asked: were the underlying PMB rationales 
reasonable? The PMB must reflect reasonable rationales, and verify whether the 
contractors implemented EVM processes, and confirm that the CAMs had the right skill 
set and direction. The IBR laid a foundation for understanding project risks. It provided 
an opportunity to compare their approach and systems to the JPO’s expectations. It was 
the first checkpoint for effective partnering to allow early intervention and application of 
resources where necessary. EVM required the contractors to measure program 
management execution and to predict cost management trends. The IBR showed that the 
contractor had incorporated lower level cost and schedule tasks consistently with the 
contract requirements. Their management could use the accumulation of lower level input 
to prove that achieving their contract approach projected a reasonable amount of risk.  
6. IBR Results 
The IBR was an in-depth analysis and assessment to determine if the contractor’s 
managers could demonstrate a logical approach with a sound basis of costs and 
reasonable schedule.  The IBR would validate whether they had an IMS change control 
and baseline control process.  The IMS demonstrated if the critical path was based on 
logic and if it showed a logical flow to accomplish the technical work scope.  It validated 
that tasks were planned and enabled objective measurement relative to technical progress. 
Processes were expected to begin in places that would integrate their IMS with work-
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breakdown structures and the contractor’s basis of estimate. The IBR surfaced where 
there were manual efforts, presented risks, and if management appropriately implemented 
processes. The early IBR dates proved to allow program performance issues to surface. 
The reviews revealed some attitudes among the contractor teams, and provided insight 
the JPO could use to advise them on their strategies and risks. The JPO did not anticipate 
corrections, but both minor and major problems surfaced. For the PM, the IBRs would 
also be indicators of whether the JPO personnel and stakeholders had the projects under 
proper visibility.  The JPO leadership realized that, although unplanned, follow-on IBRs 
would be beneficial for both the program and contractors for completing actions and 
achieving a higher level of EVM process maturity. Each IBR ended with a government 
team providing a briefing to the contractor that summarized accomplishments, risks, 
concerns, and action items. 
K. IBR TO PDR PERIOD 
IBR action items were worked and closed by the product team and contractors.  
Some actions were assigned to government-led sub-IPTs. The contractors attempted to 
make adjustments to priorities, schedule, resources, and management processes based on 
IBR feedback while preparing for the Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  The 
contractors determined when to conduct the PDR.  This was a critical decision point.  
Selection of a PDR date would mean assessing the design maturity progress, determining 
when the designs could be adequately described in a formal review, and showing they 
were ready to start submitting the initial wave of CDRL items that were due at PDR. The 
IMP listed primary activities and sub-activities expected to be addressed at PDR along 
with associated CDRLs.  Using the terms: completed, conducted, drafted, established, 
updated, or understood, the IMP outlined the contractor’s program performance 
expectations. 
This was the period where the JPO expected to see the contractor’s transition from a 
planning stage and telling the government what they will do to a ramp-up in vehicle 
development activities. Processes supporting information exchange were defined and 
refined. IBR action items were worked and closed. The identification of risks was 
expected to grow. The period was short which seemed to force the contractors to continue 
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the brisk pace the JPO desired. If the transition and pace were not demonstrated, then PM 
intervention or further elevation within the management chain would be appropriate. 
1. Purchase Description Tiers 
The JLTV TD contracts were intentionally designed to allow the contractors room 
for interpretation and encourage innovation where it made sense. Each PD requirement 
was assigned a 1, 2, or 3 priority (1 the highest). These priorities were known as tiers. 
This tiering arrangement gave the contractors a general guideline. Tier 1 requirements 
were related to or directly associated with JLTV CDD Key Performance Parameters. The 
tiering would force the contractors to stretch their design capability and thus inform the 
requirements process, while allowing some trade space. Therefore, the tiers indicated that 
the program was seeking to meet all threshold level KPPs. Through the Trade Study 
process, the contractors could choose to downgrade, propose alternatives, or announce a 
non-compliance with any PD specification that they could not meet. Each Trade Study 
was required to be submitted according to a CDRL.  The 1200+ specifications were 
tracked at the macro-level using a Requirements Compliance Matrix data deliverable.  
2. PDR Issues Assessment 
Product team members were responsible for continual assessment of contract 
performance in their functional area.  They looked for evidence of a methodical approach 
for developing PDR presentations and conducted assessments of whether the PDR would 
meet IMP criteria and expectations. They were expected to report and provide advice to 
the JPO IPT leads. It was incumbent upon them to join the contractor IPTs and become 
an active participant.  The program depended on timely and accurate knowledge of 
contractor progress. The PM needed to know when and where to step in to understand 
issues and risks.   
L. PRELIMINARYDESIGN REVIEW (PDR) 
PDR was the first of the two formal design reviews. These were four-day forums 
which involved JPO management, JLTV program stakeholders, and other government 
functional experts.  The three events for the TD contractors were comparable to the 
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SOWMs in attendance.  Scheduling the necessary key personnel created challenges for 
the JPO due to a need for most government participants to attend all three. The PDRs 
served as a comprehensive presentation of vehicle design progress and subsystem 
integration. These also were checkpoints to assess whether contractual requirements were 
understood and being met. The contractors were required to present data, 3D models or 
drawings for the vehicles that would be built and for those in which the contract only 
required delivery of PDR-level design data.  
1. PDR Content 
The contractors prepared in-depth presentation materials supported by a major 
delivery of CDRL items. PDR briefing topics included:  
 System level design 
 Requirements compliance metrics 
 System architecture 
 Detailed designs for each JLTV category 
 Vehicle structures 
 Survivability subsystems 
 Modeling and simulation results 
 Supportability concepts 
 Reliability and maintainability engineering 
 Human factors analysis 
 Safety design and assessment 
 Hazardous materials use 
 Build plans 
 Test plans 
 Major subsystems detail 
 Vetronics architecture 
 Software development 




The PDR measured contractor project management and began providing to the 
government the design information needed to start informing the requirements processes. 
Each contractor conducted dry runs with the product teams to preview briefings as much 
as possible.  
2. PDR Objectives 
PDR objectives were listed in IMP. The JPO would determine whether 
presentations and data were consistent with contractual terms. The PDR reinforced 
understanding of technical aspects and would help to validate horizontal integration and 
reveal its effectiveness across the contractor’s sub-IPTs.  Evidence of horizontal 
integration enhanced credibility of their design process. The quality of certain 
deliverables and their presentations provided a view into the inner workings of their 
program. Those key PDR deliverables included the System Engineering Management 
Plans, Risk Management Plans, Configuration and Data Management Plans, and 
Modeling and Simulation Plan along with initial delivery of modeling and simulation 
data.  In a rapid development program these documents were expected to be well 
developed and capable of guiding contract execution.  The PDRs enabled the government 
to conduct a critical analysis of the contractor concepts. The government assessed those 
areas that allowed latitude towards meeting contractual requirements,  quality of PDR 
presentations, IMP criteria accomplishment, IMP deviations, quality of CDRLs, 
contractor’s risk management approach, feasibility of completing designs, and indicators 
that the contractor would produce hardware in accordance with contract delivery terms. 
PDRs marked their higher management’s first opportunity to assess their program team’s 
performance and preparations. 
3. PDR Results 
PDRs presented the government with advanced design maturity, potential 
program issues, and risks. They indicated areas that the JPO could influence. It proved to 
be a plus that the PDRs were conducted at the contractor’s facilities by providing access 
to personnel who may not have traveled to the JPO location.  The locations allowed all 
key JPO personnel and program stakeholders to see contractor facilities that provided a 
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better feel for what the contractors were doing. The PDRs showed contractor processes 
for conducting design trade, which resulted in producing supporting logic that was 
presentable to the government and complied with the CDRL. The contractors 
demonstrated which data deliverables would become critical during production and 
hardware manufacturing along with development status. For the most part, the PDR 
presentations were consistent with contract proposals. The reviews also confirmed that 
the JPO’s concerns about several technical risks were valid. Each contractor had 
difficulty meeting weight limits and was exploring tier trades that the JPO considered to 
be unpalatable.  Recording PDR action items satisfied contract requirements to record 
minutes. 
The government assessed progress since SOWM, near-term activities, and the 
path ahead to vehicle production planning. The PDR exposed areas needing more 
maturity and work that were not apparent during SOWM and IBRs.  The PDR challenged 
the government to ask probing questions, identify risks, and assess whether critical 
actions are planned. 
M. PDR TO CDR PERIOD 
If the JPO had not made it clear until the PDR that the JLTV program fully 
intended to meet its schedule, was committed to controlling cost, and was confident in the 
future requirements, it seemed loud and clear in the post-PDR period. The PDRs 
produced numerous action items, CDRL item revisions, and necessity for additional 
meetingsMaintaining budgets began to challenge them in this period as assumptions were 
validated and some risks were realized. The contractors’ own PDR objective was to set 
themselves up for CDR preparations immediately after concluding PDR was revised. 
Once again, they were allowed to set the date, but they knew the government had much 
higher expectations for the CDR than they did for PDR.  The trade process gave them 
options. Options could save time, reduce costs, and enable a course of action. However, 
the JLTV’s competitive environment would silently influence design solutions.  
The contractors learned that close discussions with the JPO were necessary and to 
value collaboration. They recognized the benefits of the JPO’s support and teaming in the 
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reviews. During the period leading to the CDR, the contractors were expected to refine 
designs, address quality of deliverables, plan for next wave of CDRL deliveries, plan for 
long lead time materials and parts, engage sub-contractors, initiate production planning, 
and use their risk management processes. The government looked for evidence that the 
design was maturing as expected. The amount of information the program was obtaining 
helped JPO personnel begin to develop greater JLTV expertise. It also helped confirm 
what subject matter experts were needed and when. The PDR and data deliveries began 
exposing the Requirements IPT to the designs and solutions which would support the KP 
that followed. 
N. USER JURY 
The JPO sought opportunities for soldier and marine representatives to become 
actively involved. Terms were included in the contracts to require a User Jury. These 
were held at the contractor’s facilities during the time between PDR and CDR. The 
contractors were tasked to use any form of mock-ups or prototype crew compartments to 
conduct hands-on evaluation by teams of soldiers and marines who represented the types 
of users who will operate JLTVs in the future. The JPO arranged for the teams to be 
available for several days at each contractor’s site.  The contracts required a detailed User 
Jury plan to accomplish expectations that were listed in the IMP.  The plans concentrated 
on human factors design elements, such as access, egress, seat adjustments and belts, 
visibility, gauges, and controls. JPO personnel were on hand for each event.  
O. CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW 
Like PDR, the CDR gave the contractors some clarity on areas that were open to 
interpretation. The JPO developed a CDR format suitable for the JLTV TD phase. The 
primary purposes were to continue gaining design information that would aid the next 
KPs and to influence prototype test planning decisions.  The contractors were interested 
in how well they performed, but the government was somewhat vague about how or 
whether they would evaluate CDR success. The contract provided a brief requirement to 
present their detailed designs and modeling and simulation results. The contractors were 




CDRs were conducted similarly to the PDRs with the same participants plus 
executives from government and industry.  Content was based on the IMP criteria. 
Product teams collaborated with their contractors to develop agendas. Lessons learned 
from PDR were incorporated. The final versions for the three CDR agendas were similar. 
If the PDR was well done, the CDR was still expected to be better. To help accomplish 
that, the JPO product teams actively participated in the OEM’s internal peer reviews in 
the weeks preceding the CDR. In addition, the JPO looked for continued improvement of 
CDRL quality. The contractors seemed to welcome brainstorming, bluntness, and 
transparency. Presentations included 3D models and addressed:  
 System overview 
 Requirements compliance 
 Transportability 
 Key performance parameters 
 Risk management 
 Technical growth 
 Human factors 
 Safety 
 Modeling and simulation 
 Supportability concepts and deliverables 
 Test vehicle build 
 Integrated Master Schedule 
 Test plans 
 Detailed designs for each vehicle category 
 Survivability 
 Vehicle subsystems 
 Software 




Problem-solving processes were demonstrated. Contractors were expected to 
show where risk management was being applied, and that issues surfaced as risks first. 
The JPO looked to validate that resources were in place to intensively manage problems. 
The last days of the CDRs included an assessment of whether the contractors appeared to 
be ready to deliver vehicle designs to their procurement and manufacturing groups. The 
government leadership provided feedback on the last day on positive areas, constructive 
criticism, risk areas, continuing issues while restating a commitment to their success that 
was expressed at SOWM. 
3. Results 
The CDRs occurred approximately six months after contract awards. With just six 
months remaining to hardware delivery they served as progress checkpoints.  
Presentations were more polished than the PDR from four to five months earlier. 
However, the CDRs lacked depth in some areas compared to PDRs. This may have been 
due, in part, because the CDRs were not held at the contractor’s facilities. There were 
missed opportunities to tour the system integration lab, demonstrate simulations, and 
view testing projects. While enabling some course corrections, the events did not reveal 
many risks for the vehicle build phase.  The CDRs provided the contractors a better 
understanding of some evolving JLTV CDD requirements. It gave them clarity and 
emphasized priorities. 
P. CDR TO TRR 
1. Vehicle Build Phase 
The post-CDR period leading to Test Readiness Review (TRR) was more 
outcomes-oriented compared to IMP-scripted events such as IBR and CDR.  Design data 
delivery reduced as CDR actions closed out and each contractor transitioned to 
production. With the exception for meeting a final inspection list, quality controls tailored 
for prototype manufacturing were not specified in the contracts. The contractors would be 
given greater latitude for quality control for these stall-built vehicles than would be 
expected with production representative vehicles assembled for a First Article Test.  
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Similarly, the contractors were required to deliver minimal data to show production 
planning and readiness. The product teams encouraged the contractors to develop new 
metrics for weekly meetings and PMRs. As a result, each government-contractor team 
tended to develop unique production metrics and reports. The JPO and product teams 
continued to use IMS analysis, EVM tools, along with production metrics to assess 
progress.  Product team members continually evaluated technical data, program 
information, schedules, and production status in order to assemble a comprehensive 
viewpoint.  
2. Government Participation in Build 
Despite the lack of contractual terms, the product team relied upon active 
engagement to maintain build progress insight. Product team members conducted 
frequent visits to the plants during production. They reviewed work instructions and 
asked probing questions.  JPO personnel participated in the contractor’s daily 
procurement meetings. DCMA quality assurance representatives helped provide JPO with 
insight through meeting attendance and daily observations. PMRs were conducted at the 
manufacturing facilities.  As a result of the proactive approach, the teams were able to 
surface and identify specific build phase risks that were emerging and would enable 
management to make informed assessments and take actions.   
3. Competitive Influences 
The competitive environment was applying pressure to meet schedules. Before, 
and shortly after CDR, the contractors were making design trades. These included 
program trades of costs, manpower, testing, quality control, risks, and schedule. Cost 
constraints were constraining how contractors did business. Competitive pressure held 
the strongest influence over the contractors at this point. None of the three wanted to 
deliver vehicles late. As a result they chose to reduce the amount of pre-delivery testing, 
known as the Shakedown Test. The contracts enabled that choice.  
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Q. TEST READINESS REVIEW 
The Pre-TRR and TRRs were the last major program events before vehicle 
deliveries and the prototype test. The product teams were actively helping contractors to 
meet the program schedule. Contractors were conducting their tests while the prototype 
build continued in high gear. Critical events such as final vehicle inspections, tester 
training classes, vehicle acceptance and shipments, vehicle characterizations, employing 
field service teams, conducting an Overarching IPT, and media events were being 
scheduled. JPO members continued to volunteer skills and abilities, and take ownership 
of critical tasks.  
1. TRR Conduct 
Conducting TRRs were dictated by Army Regulation 73-1. They were decision 
gates to ensure test readiness was met and exit criteria were established. TRR 
preparations and objectives were guided by the IMP. They would support the PM’s 
decision to proceed to test. A Letter of Instruction (LOI) was prepared to establish the 
process that assesses whether JLTV test vehicles, personnel, ranges, and all other 
resources are ready to be committed to Government Vehicle Testing with safe and 
manageable risks. The LOI guided the contractors through the conduct of Pre-TRRs and 
what to address at the TRRs. TRR success criteria and briefings included: 
 Vehicles had been accepted. 
 Vehicle test limitations and constraints were identified. 
 CDRL status. 
 Status of required subsystem testing. 
 Shakedown results. 
 Shakedown issues or acceptance deficiencies corrected. 
 Government-Furnished Equipment and special purpose kits were 
incorporated. 
 Field Service Representatives (FSR) to support test were ready.  
 Spares parts, special equipment, and tools were available. 
 Tester training packages were ready. 
 Operators manuals were available. 
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 Safety report with all hazards and warnings identified was ready. 
 Contractors had funding available to support full duration of the test. 
All TRRs were conducted well enough to enable the PM to make three test readiness 
decision risk assessments. As a result, each contractor team gained approval to proceed to 
test.  
R. TEST PHASE 
In April-May 2010 each contractor delivered the test vehicles in accordance with 
the contract deadline. A sample from each contractor was displayed in the Pentagon 
courtyard for one day. This event was followed by VIP and media “ride and drives” at a 
test center. Within three months later, the Australian right-hand drive versions also  also 
delivered on time. A total of 46 JLTV vehicles and trailers were eventually in test at the 
same time at U.S. and Australian test centers from May 2010–June 2011. Testing 
required intensive planning and schedule management by the Government Test and 
Evaluation IPT. The contractors relied on a continual effort by the IPTs to provide 
assistance with resolving problems. Test results continued to influence the specifications 





A. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS 
The JLTV JPO utilized the three competitive prototype contracts to accomplish 
the key TD tasks: JLTV prototype design, development, modeling and simulation, 
testing, and validating requirements.  The three contractors produced prototypes with 
unique aspects that were suitable for testing and delivered them in accordance with the 
terms of the contract schedule JLTV unit manufacturing cost information gleaned from 
the phase increased estimate confidence and enabled presentation of will/should cost 
analysis for the milestone decision and program life cycle. Program processes were 
verified or improved. JPO personnel gained valuable system engineering skills and 
experiences that will benefit the JLTV program in the future. A tremendous amount of 
data was collected which continued to be used for the technology readiness assessment, 
requirements processes, affordability decisions, and program milestone documentation. 
The program increased confidence in operational performance through test and 
evaluation of actual performance capabilities. Soldiers, Marines, and Australian Army 
personnel were involved during multiple evaluation events. Cost, schedule, and technical 
risks were identified or mitigated throughout the project. EMD risks to be carried forward 
will influence program strategies and plans.  
Information from the TD phase has significantly changed the requirements 
moving forward into EMD by updating, reducing, or eliminating non-essential 
capabilities. Difficult trade-offs became necessary. The program learned through TD that 
requirements were not effectively aligned with the initial vehicle categories and missions.   
RFP language was described in tiered performance terms which forced contractors to 
develop some creative approaches. Some strategies contributed to a contract management 
effort more significant than projected. Approximately 30 modifications were awarded to 
each contract. Some were driven by unforeseen requirements for additional hardware. 
Some were driven by financial reasons and Australian participation that did not solidify 




Even though the three contractors involved were large defense businesses their 
program teams lacked experience with this type of contract for ground equipment. It 
required a learning curve that was not factored into the TD schedule.  The JPO-contractor 
relationships required a high degree of openness given the many performance-oriented 
requirements.  TD required a rigorous application of system engineering and integration. 
Acknowledging that fact led to obtaining the data and knowledge the JPO sought. Many 
lessons were learned that will directly contribute to the planning and conduct of the next 
and future phases.  
Contractors saw the JPO’s commitment to success throughout the contract 
periods. It started with a promise at SOWM followed by the JPO’s demonstration of 
commitment to support throughout. This commitment was demonstrated through frequent 
collaboration on problems to witnessing government personnel speaking up on their 
behalf. The government promised to carefully manage their critical information and 
proved it through processes and action.  
JLTV TD demonstrated that competitive prototyping can work. The three 
contracts were awarded using full-and-open procedures. The government made it clear to 
industry that the future JLTV contract would also use a full-and-open strategy. As a result 
competition was being driven by real performance on actual hardware. The program 
leveraged the environment. There were few disagreements of whether work was within 
scope. The competitive strategy kept the emphasis on the contractors to meet cost and 
schedule and work effectively with the JPO. No one wanted to be late to the Pentagon or 
experience the potential ramifications in the media. 
C. PLANNED OR UNEXPECED KEYS TO SUCCESS 
The JPO felt empowered. Because competitive prototyping was new, no one 
could rely on the norm to tell the JPO they were wrong. The JPO sensed in the chain of 
command that if a plan was presented, it would get support. However, the JPO did not get 
a free ride and had to work hard to win and retain stakeholder support.  
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There were environmental influences during TD that may have provided major 
positive competitive factors. A new formal process and data base known as the Contract 
Performance Assessment Rating System (CPARS) was deployed.  The JPO would 
prepare annual CPARS input for each contract. CPARS results were intended to be used 
in the competition for the next JLTV contract. CPARS information would also be 
available for other government source selection efforts where the TD contractors were 
involved. Secondly, Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicle procurement was 
beginning to diminish as the requirements to support deployed forces were being filled.  
JLTV market research and TD experience showed that many of the same companies with 
interest in JLTV were also involved in MRAP competitions or support. JLTV provided a 
potential new market. Thirdly, budget supplementals used to modernize much of the 
Army’s medium and heavy tactical vehicle fleets were ending, and budgets for tactical 
vehicles were forecasted to downsize in the future years.  
D. ANALYSIS OF JLTV KEY TENETS FOR EMD OR OTHER 
COMPETITIVE PROTOTYPE PROGRAMS 
The results of the JLTV TD design and build phase validated or emphasized some 
program management lessons learned that could be applicable to the EMD phase or other 
acquisition programs with a TD phase.  
1. Requirements Process Effectiveness 
Establishing the Requirements IPT, RMAP, and a series of KPs were right for the 
JLTV program. As a joint program it would continue to have conflicts over costs, 
schedule, performance, requirements, and the acquisition strategy.  JLTV had many 
potential solutions or methods, and much left to prove. Planning and conducting the KPs 
was a rigorous effort that demanded participation. The Army and USMC PEOs and 
service leadership had a formal process that they could confidently use to evaluate, 
decide, present, and defend the program. 
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2. JLTV JPO Organizational Structure Effectiveness 
The JPO was organized to spark forward thinking that would identify risks or 
capture and analyze lessons learned while developing and revising plans. The three 
simultaneous contracts all with the same requirements and schedules created friendly 
competition among the product teams. The situation also leveraged applying the best 
approaches to tasks and problem solving. The office staff was often shorthanded because 
demands kept growing. It managed an acceptable readiness state for higher level reviews 
because of a methodical way of capturing information and channeling it to prepare and 
then support the reviews.  
Team leaders were given a great deal of supervisory latitude which freed the PM 
and DPM to focus less on administrative matters. Functional leads could assess 
capabilities and identify SME gaps. Then develop a proposed approach, coach, train, or 
seek people with the needed skill set to address the gaps. Task delegation decisions could 
consider opportunities to develop new skills for the JPO. Team leaders were responsible 
for initiating most rewards and recognition.  The program depended on creativity and 
initiative, therefore, it would have benefited from a guiding policy or other means to 
nudge leaders where appropriate, such as recognition at PMRs.  
Product team members who also belonged to a functional team were often pulled 
in two directions by the organization structure.  As a result the product team leaders were 
often challenged to negotiate common ground with functional leaders. Both product and 
functional IPTs reported more in the vertical direction while assuring the horizontal 
communication flow was sufficient. 
Functional teams had a tendency to be stove-piped because leaders, specialists, 
and senior managers focused on the team’s objectives. Some teams did not have a broad 
mix of functional specialists and were not true IPTs. Functional leads may not have 
realized they had power to decide how or when to involve the other functional IPTs and 
product team, such as attending meetings, working tasks, or visiting other agencies and 
companies. Functional leaders tended to be focused on their area and did not always 
consider impact on other teams. However, it was not always the functional leader's fault. 




T&E IPT performed vehicle delivery oversight at the same time government testing was 
being planned. Product teams needed a production manager and a T&E manager, not one 
manager to perform both functions. 
Synchronization enabled a process-oriented organization for report out, metrics 
collection, metrics analysis, and problem resolution. The 120-day calendar review 
became the single most valuable tool in the process because of the busy program and 
contract management schedules. All leaders were free to present concerns and issues at 
the synch meetings without prior discussions with other teams. Coordination meetings 
among team leaders were not part of the JPO battle rhythm. The synch meeting could 
work effectively on many levels and helped with the horizontal flow but could drive 
leaders to decide to hold concerns for the next meeting. This became one of the primary 
reasons the meetings might exceed scheduled time. Synch meeting did not have a set end 
time and could last for three hours. It satisfied the PM’s need for information, but would 
have been improved with more consistent recording of minutes and action items. 
3. JLTV STRATCOM Process Effectiveness 
Establishing and following a JLTV Strategic Communication supported a philosophy 
to use the frequent major events as opportunities to correctly and consistently present the 
facts. It insured JPO, stakeholders, and contractors knew about the importance of key 
events. The product teams were expected to assure that contractors were on board. Much 
of the approach was based on marketing techniques. Information customers (media, 
industry, service and OSD staffers, congressional staffers) could rely on the strategy if 
the plan was followed. However, establishing and maintaining STRATCOM was a 
commitment and would require buy-in from future JPO leadership. It creates new risks if 
accurate information is not available and customers need to seek other sources. 
4. Application of Battle Rhythm Concept 
Execution of battle rhythm with the contractors was determined by the product 
teams. There were no written guidelines. The three APM team leaders often discussed 
strategy, methods, and results. Battle rhythm created a continual awareness that the 
interaction with the government team had a direct influence on the path of the program as 
54 
 
the contractors gained understanding that the PM had this battle rhythm strategy. 
Government and contractor leadership were aware there was a mechanism that 
maintained a flow of exchange and could keep them current. It did not necessarily allow 
PM leadership and contractor counterparts to relax their engagement, but it enabled more 
meaningful interaction and efficient agendas. Some momentum was lost following the 
SOWM.  More frequent interaction was needed to gain mutual assurance that contract 
language and design requirements were clearly understood and government-contractor 
relationships developed quickly. Each IPT must use a system to record and work action 
items until completed or closed. A consistent approach across IPTs and contracts would 
aid accuracy and utility. Requiring weekly reports and chart updates even when regular 
meetings are cancelled would have helped to maintain the activity level.  
5. Effectiveness of Integrated Data Environment 
Shared server drives and ACE were adequate interim repositories; however, the 
JPO was missing a plan to guide decisions and aid research for archiving project data. 
The amount of data that was accumulating also pointed to a need for a documented data 
configuration management strategy.  It became clear that a more comprehensive IT 
solution would be needed to support the next phase. 
6. SOWM Effectiveness 
According to DAU’s website, the “New Program Startup Workshop” was 
designed to “create an environment of teamwork, collaboration, communication and 
trust.” DAU recommended an agenda that had been designed and conducted for other 
ACAT I program kickoffs. The three SOWMs were major events in the forming of a 
future MDAP. Together they formed a JLTV strategic event suitable for the DAU 
concept and executive-level attendance. The concept helped established a clear 
understanding of the project foundation for each of the three projects and emphasized 
teamwork that would be needed. The SOWM laid out challenges and some high level 





introduced expectations for communication and the battle rhythm concept. Expressions of 
honesty and inviting the contractors to embrace program ownership both sought to begin 
building trust.  
The NPSW objectives seemed to be based on a premise that the government 
lacked a supportive environment with the new contractors. The government had already 
completed successful JLTV R&D projects with two of the contractors. And TACOM had 
a long positive history with all them on other ground vehicle programs. The source 
selection process succeeded with choosing from among a capable group. Less time 
should have been allowed to share the message about teamwork, collaboration, and trust. 
Team building would likely have occurred through less formal opportunities. More time 
was needed for schedule details, battle rhythm, technical approach, and meeting contract 
requirements. Some participants could have concluded these areas were purposely de-
emphasized and some critical messages were buried. Break outs should have been shorter 
and more focused so the right people were available. The agenda should have allowed 
margin for unscheduled briefing or meetings. Action items should have been reviewed at 
the end of each day while issues were fresh. 
The SOWM concepts were good, but the JPO was a shorthanded staff tasked with 
an ambitious 15-month schedule.  The JPO was severely challenged to accomplish three 
week-long meetings. The time and opportunity while all the right people were available 
needed a more efficient agenda to enable discussion of the contract, risks, plans, and 
schedule development. 
7. Earned Value Management Effectiveness 
IBR success might have benefited from a simulation or walk-through of the 
proceedings leading up to the IBR. A practice session would have likely surfaced some 
actions or issues prior to the events. 
EVM data and analysis it required provided timely insight into costs and schedule 
health. The data provided some of the cost analysis support required for budget, OIPT, 
and other pre-Milestone B reviews. The process required analysis of cost by account 
managers at the lowest levels. It supported accurate metrics reporting through the 
analysis required by both the government and contractor of vertically traceable variance 
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explanations. EVM required development and periodic submissions of the Integrated 
Master Schedule which was integral to the cost data. The initial data submissions should 
be a check point for the product team to study what the contractors provide, who in the 
government will use the information, how it will be used, and how analysis will help the 
program. The value of EVM artifacts should be clear to the product team members well 
before the IBR. 
An IMS for a complex project like JLTV prototype development cannot be well-
developed without a top to bottom integrated effort. An analysis of critical path, 
predecessor/successor task logic, float, durations, change management, and consistency 
with reports and presentation material can provide a direct reflection of contractor 
program management maturity.  The JPO and DCMA used the IMS as a basis for 
contractor performance assessment and to determine if work required under the contract 
was identified and consistent with the IMP framework.  Contractors were required to 
perform regular IMS assessments. These provided additional insight into contract 
execution planning, activity integration across teams, and program management.  Fully 
developing an IMS required input from all technical teams, leaders, contract 
management, business management, and program management. Flaws and weaknesses 
identified by the JPO IMS analysts suggested contractor performance issues and risks. 
IMS analysis complemented EVM reporting, risk management, and PM business 
management activities. Positive trends in IMS development and attaining an acceptable 
level of quality increased the PM’s confidence. 
8. Requirements Trade-off 
Deciding purchase description tiers is a labor intensive effort, but the effort pays 
off in many areas. It will lay ground work for trade-off analysis and reviews. The 
eventual JLTV design would be unique in many ways from legacy tactical wheeled 
vehicles. The still developing protection, payload, and performance requirements could 
have become even more difficult to achieve in the next program phases. The tiering 
concept was understood by the Combat Developer stakeholders and supported Key 
Performance Parameter decisions. The method provided the JPO with a systematic 
approach for managing and prioritizing specifications. 
57 
 
9. Risk Management Effectiveness 
As time passed, the contractor’s planning mistakes had a broader impact on the 
schedule, costs, and tasks. This reality seemed to accelerate after PDR. The product 
teams were challenged to constantly assess and surface potential problems. The high 
schedule tempo needed wide-eyed risk identification.  Implement a risk strategy through 
the following: building trust and openness; conducting risk training early on; requiring 
early delivery of a final risk management plan; ensuring early implementation of risk 
management; putting project plans and tasks through a risk test; and seeking ways to 
adjust the process and expectations. The system engineering management plans 
documenting the Risk Management process should have been finalized earlier. The 
SEMP was the playbook. Completion would have helped verify there was a 
comprehensive and logical approach. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Forming the JPO demanded a bottom-to-top strategy built around a proactive 
approach, establishing teams, and setting a tempo to keep lines of communication open. 
Preparation of good quality and properly staffed Milestone B was a significant 
expectation during competitive prototyping in TD.  The documents would be touched by 
many hands at stakeholder agencies within the DOD. The strategy was designed to create 
opportunities to engage stakeholders as early as possible and influence the outcomes. 
Future JPO leaders would need to recognize their predecessors’ intentions, utilize the 
ground work and strive to continue expanding the network. JLTV was still not a program 
of record, and as a future MDAP the program was vulnerable to setbacks due to 
continuing changes in acquisition policy.  It was thought that those risks might be 
mitigated as people understood what it meant to be considered a JLTV stakeholder and 
they used their authority to maintain access to current information. The Milestone A 
process and pre-Milestone B activity provided exposure at USD (AT&L) and helped to 
keep program leaders knowledgeable and prepared to be in compliance with the WSARA 
(Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009), in such areas as competitive 
prototyping and trade-off analysis of cost, schedule, and performance objectives for the 
JCIDS process.  
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